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Comments
Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)
Amelia F. Burroughs*
"This is the easiest vehicle for stopping discovery that I have seen
in forty-five years of practice. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
flirted with "refining" the scope of discovery in civil litigation, but in the end chose
not to make any changes.2 More than twenty years later, the 1978 flirtation has
matured into a love affair. On December 1, 2000, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 26(b)(1) was amended to reflect concerns that discovery in federal civil
cases has mushroomed into something "inappropriately broad.",
3
Since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery has been
the focus of much debate. 4 "Courts have come to recognize the centrality of broad
discovery in providing evidentiary support for certain kinds of cases."5 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that discovery is contentious, 6 litigious, 7 and costly.8 Empirical
evidence reflects the same, but only in a small number of complex cases. 9 With that
in mind,,in April of 2000, the Advisory Committee recommended, and the United
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, conferred May 2002; B.A., CSU, Sacramento,
1999. 1 wish to thank Professor Michael Vitiello for his support and his dedication to preparing his students for civil
practice, and the staff of the McGeorge Law Review for all their hard work in the production of this Comment.
1. Sol Schreiber, in Videotape: New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal
Rules of Evidence (ALI-ABA Video Law Review, ABA Center for CLE, ABA Section of Litigation 2000)
(roundtable discussion with the following participants: Gregory Joseph, John Kobayashi, Professor Myles V. Lynk,
Hon. Lee Rosenthal, Hon. Shira Ann Scheindlin, Sol Schreiber, and the Hon. Fern Smith) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
3. Id.
4. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 6-7
(1992).
5. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747, 750 (1998). Cases such as
products liability and employer discrimination, for example, are types of cases in which broad discovery often leads
to evidentiary support. Id. at 749.
6. Bell, supra note 4, at 2.
7. John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 524 (2000).
8. Bell, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that, for clients, much of the cost of litigation is incurred in discovery).
9. Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1999).
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States Supreme Court approved, amendments to rules that govern discovery in
federal court.'1 Though the Advisory Committee amended other rules, the
amendment to FRCP 26(b)(1) was the "most controversial."" The recent
amendments no longer allow discovery of information "relevant to the matter in the
pending action,"' 2 but confine discovery to matters "relevant to the claim or defense
of any party."' 3 The new rule also creates a two-tiered discovery mechanism. The
first tier is attorney-controlled, self-executing discovery. 14 The second tier requires
a showing of good cause and judicial oversight. 5 Finally, the 2000 amendment to
FRCP 26 no longer allows jurisdictions to opt out of mandatory disclosure, but
requires all federal district courts to follow the rule.
16
The Advisory Committee's intent was threefold. The amendments intended to
curb the abuse of discovery by litigants,"' involve the judiciary more actively in
discovery,' 8 and provide uniformity in the application of discovery rules in all
federal district courts.' 9 To understand why the 2000 amendments were
controversial, this Comment first examines the history of discovery in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This Comment then examines the background to the 2000
amendments, the amendments themselves, and the threefold impetus behind the
2000 amendments.20 Finally, this Comment measures the impact of the 2000
amendments on civil pretrial litigation.2'
10. Gregory P. Joseph, The 2000 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules: A Preliminary Analysis, 628
PL/LIT. 379, 381 (2000).
11. Schreiber, supra note 1.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (before December 1, 2001).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
17. Lynk, supra note 1. Note, however, that when the Advisory Committee transmitted the 2000
amendments to the Judicial Conference, the Advisory Committee noted, "The Committee determined expressly not
to review the question of discovery abuse, a matter that had been the subject of repeated rules activity over the
years." Memorandum from Hon. Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Honorable
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (May 11, 1999) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Niemeyer Memorandum]. "[T]he Committee determined to focus on the architecture of discovery rules
and determined whether modest changes could be effected to reduce the costs of discovery, to increase its efficiency,
to restore uniformity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary to participate more actively in case management."
Id.
18. Lynk, supra note 1.
19. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
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II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Before the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, civil discovery in
federal court was limited. The Conformity Act of 1872 required civil procedure in
federal courts to conform as closely as possible to the state court civil procedure
rules in which the federal court resided. One result was that predicting which
procedures would apply in federal civil cases was difficult.24 Opponents of the
Conformity Act argued that "many federal procedural statutes and practices
justifiably took precedence over conformity to state law."'25 On a practical level,
opponents of the Conformity Act argued that one particularly painful cost for
interstate corporations was that they had to retain specialized lawyers in each state.26
Opponents also argued that if federal courts had uniform procedural rules, state
courts would follow, resulting in federal and interstate uniformity.
27
After much public debate, Congress voted to enact the Rules Enabling Act of
1934 (REA).2" The REA empowered the United States Supreme Court to create
procedural rules to be applied in all federal trial courts.29 The purpose of the
resulting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "was to fashion a procedural framework
in which the process could function effectively, free of surprise and technical
encumbrance. ,30 Draftsmen considered discovery one mechanism which encouraged
the parties to settle, and if not to settle, then at least "shorten and streamline the trial
process by narrowing the issues" and organizing the available data.3 By making all
relevant evidence available to the parties involved, discovery assisted the litigants
to reach a just outcome.32 The original draftsmen of the federal rules for discovery
felt discovery's purpose was to accomplish "the location and disclosure of all the
unprivileged evidentiary data that might prove useful in resolving a given dispute.
33
Since the inception of the federal rules, discovery was designed to be a mechanism
22. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Discovery
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694-97 (1998) [hereinafter Subrin 1].
23. Judicial Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (repealed 1938).
24. See Thomas Wall Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure-Let Congress Set the Supreme Court Free, 73
CENT. L.J. 319, 320-21 (1911).
25. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 692.
26. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin 2].
27. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 693.
28. See Stephen F. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1048-98 (1982).
29. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 956-61 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin 3].
30. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 701,701 (1989) (citing W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 24 (1968); Judith
Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 504-05 (1986)).
31. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change,
30 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301-03 (1978).
32. Schwarzer, supra note 30, at 703.
33. Brazil, supra note 31, at 1298-99.
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by which "'[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts will be achieved,' 34
regardless of the financial status of the litigants.35
Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, common law and code pleadings
detailed requirements regarding the pleading of ultimate and nonprobative facts.36
Code pleadings served to narrow the issues in the litigation, identify baseless claims,
and present each party's position based upon the facts as known to them.
37
Discovery under the code procedures was very limited, usually to the plaintiff's
cause of action.38One example is New York's Field Code which allowed only
depositions of an opposing party.39 "Code deposition was in lieu of calling the
adverse party at the trial, and subject to the 'same rules of examination' as at trial.4
A pretrial deposition ... was to be before a judge who would rule on evidence
objections.",41 David Dudley Field, who had libertarian views about authority and
the judiciary, authored the Field Code. The present pejorative power of the term
'fishing expedition' is attributed to Field. "[T]o permit fishing in an opponent's
mind or files, under the auspices of the judiciary, was an outrage to those who
opposed expanded discovery., 42 The Field Code influenced many states' procedural
codes.43
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, represented a shift to short and
plain pleadings, 44 and one result was that the pleadings alone were not sufficient to
34. Id. at 1298 (quoting and adding emphasis to Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
35. Kathleen L. Blaner et al., Federal Discovery: Crown Jewel or Curse?, 24 No. 4 LITIG. 8, 8 (1998).
Blaner writes:
Discovery was considered a crown jewel because it sought to open the courts to all elements of society.
The drafters saw an imbalance of power between the wealthy and the poor. By mandating a full
exchange of information, the drafters thought that they could help less powerful litigants prove their
legal claims and thus redress the imbalance.
Id.
36. For examples of code pleadings, see McCaughey v. Schuette, 117 Cal. 233, 224-26, 48 P. 1088 (1897)
and California Packing Corp. v. Kelly Storage & Distributing Co., 126 N.E. 269 (1920).
37. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1377-78 (1986).
38. Downie v. Nettleton, 61 Conn. 593, 24 A. 977 (1892) ("The plaintiffs right to a discovery does not
extend to all facts which may be material to the issue, but is confined to facts which are material to his own title or
cause of action. It does not enable him to pry into the defendant's case, or find out evidence by which that case will
be supported."). Id. at 978 (emphasis added). See also Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 695-96; CHARLES E. CLARK, 8
CASES ON MODERN PLEADING 464-65 (1952).
39. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 696.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 697. In 1932, in his influential study of discovery practices, George Ragland explained that "the
epithet 'fishing excursion of the adverse party's evidence' has been employed against the taking of depositions for
discovery in every state where it has been attempted, first for the purpose of preventing the examination entirely,
and failing this, for the purpose of restricting its scope." Id. (citing GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE
TRIAL 17-18, 120 (1932)).
43. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 695-96.
44. Subrin 3, supra note 29, at 956-61.
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prepare for the disposition of a case.45 "The inadequacy of the disclosure given by
the pleadings as a basis for trial ... led to the utilization of depositions and other
discovery devices which allow[ed] the parties to investigate the factual basis of the
litigation. 46
With the federal change in pleading requirements in mind, one creator of the
federal rules, Edson Sunderland, advocated expanding discovery at the federal level.
He envisioned a preliminary proceeding in which the opposing party expected "to
submit himself and his witnesses to interrogation under oath. 47 Sunderland believed
this preliminary procedure was the only way to determine the "true nature" of the
controversy between parties.48 In fact, Sunderland's draft for the federal discovery
rules "included a method for what we now call mandatory disclosure: a means to
force the opponent to 'furnish adequately descriptive lists of documents, books,
accounts, letters of other papers, photographs, or other tangible things which are
known to him and relevant to the pending cause or to any designated part
thereof.. . ,,49However, Sunderland' s tentative proposal for mandatory disclosure
did not become part of the 1938 rules.50 Understandably, the Advisory Committee
was concerned with "the problems inherent in liberal discovery; they also feared that
discovery opponents might succeed in defeating the entire set of rules."" The 1937
Advisory Committee was particularly concerned with public and judicial response
to what some viewed as liberal "fishing expeditions" and "the power given the
plaintiff. 5 2 Even Sunderland himself "admitted that he was going further than any
single jurisdiction's discovery provisions. 53 Sunderland and the Advisory
Committee also had "misgivings about the potential for using discovery to blackmail
others and to force settlement more related to the costs of discovery than to the
merits of the case. 54 Despite their reservations, depositions, at least, were given a
fairly broad scope: "Relevant to the subject matter in the pending action."
55
45. Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules in Practice: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator
of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2181 (1989).
46. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 567-72 (2d ed. 1947).
47. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 716.
48. Id.
49. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 718-19 (quoting Rule 57(a), Tentative Draft No. 1, Oct. 16, 1935, in Records
of the U.S. Judicial Conference: Committees on the Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935-1988, at C1-804-22).
50. Id. at 719.
51. Id. Sunderland had no precedent for the combination of liberalized discovery he proposed, but "almost
every type of discovery he drafted became and remains part of the Federal Rules: oral and written depositions;
written interrogatories; motions to inspect and copy documents and to inspect tangible and real property; physical
and mental examinations of persons; and requests for admissions." Id. at 718. He even proposed what we now
consider mandatory disclosure, but this particular recommendation was not adopted by the Advisory Committee.
Id.
52. Id. at 720.
53. Id.; see id. (explaining that, essentially, Sunderland combined all the possible discovery tools found in
state code procedures).
54. Id. at 730.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); 308 U.S. 645 (1938). Note that Rule 34, however, allowed that particular scope
of discovery only "upon motion of any party showing good cause." 329 U.S. 845, 857 (1946).
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Questions still remained about whether the same scope applied to other discovery
tools (for example, requests for admissions and document demands).56 In 1938, the
scope of deposition discovery under the Federal Rules far exceeded that allowed
under many code procedures.57 An expanded scope of discovery for other discovery
devices was not far behind.58
Many writers believe that the original discovery rules worked well for the first
thirty years. 59 Exchanges of information between litigants were modest, compared
to modern standards.6 ° In 1946, however, the Advisory Committee amended FRCP
26 to clarify the scope of discovery: "All discovery was made subject to an
overarching 'scope of discovery' provision ... which was then referred back to in
the other discovery rules."'6 1 An expanded scope for discovery was no longer
confined to depositions alone. "[C]ourts began to read the discovery rules more
broadly, starting with the 1947 United States Supreme Court decision that
proclaimed that the discovery rules authorized litigants to fish through their
opponents' files. '62 In Hickman v. Taylor, the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned the liberal scope of discovery: "No longer can the time-honored cry of
'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case.' 63
Although the Supreme Court gave its nod to expanded discovery, that was not
enough to satisfy attorneys and litigants in future cases. With the expansion of equal
rights legislation and the use of the courts as "an instrument for social change,"
litigation in federal courts expanded beyond what the original drafters of the Federal
56. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 734.
57. The scope of discovery for depositions differed from document discovery, for example. "Document
discovery, in particular, was until 1946 subject to a narrow scope permitting discovery of documents 'which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action,' and until 1970 available only on
motion based on a showing of 'good cause."' Marcus, supra note 5, at 748 (quoting 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2201 (2d ed. 1994)). The good cause requirement could be found in
Rule 34. Id.
58. See infra notes 60-61.
59. Schwarzer, supra note 30, at 704; Blaner, supra note 35, at 8. But see Brazil, supra note 31, at 1303-04
(suggesting that discovery was based upon a faulty premise-that "adversary gamemanship" would not extend to
the realm of discovery).
60. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8.
61. Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 736 (quoting Advisory Committee's notes, "The purpose of discovery is to
allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation
or presentation of his case.... [M]atters entirely without bearing either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence
are not within the scope of inquiry, but to the extent that the examination develops useful information, it functions
successfully as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces no testimony directly admissible." Id.
62. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)). See also Carter, supra note
45, at 2183 (presenting case-filing statistics to support the existence of a trend toward stigmatization of certain
claims in federal courts).
63. 329 U.S. 495,507 (1947).
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Rules of Civil Procedure expected.64 With burgeoning litigation in federal courts
came expanded demands for discovery.65
66In 1970, Rule 26 was restructured to serve as a general guide for discovery.
The 1970 amendments are considered the "high water mark" of Rule 26 party-
controlled discovery.67 Previous to 1970, "there were strict limits to the use of
discovery devices, but the 1970 amendments lifted many of them., 68 Not only were
limits lifted, but the availability of discovery expanded, in general, including a
recision of the requirement that document discovery be available for "good cause." 69
Along with the expansion of Rule 26 in 1970 came an immediate concern of abuse.70
"By the mid-1970s, ... confidence in attorneys' abilities to manage discovery
efficiently had begun to erode. 71 Partly, this erosion stemmed from "very broad
opposition to the liberality of discovery [that] grew in the early 1970s."72 Many
opponents to liberal discovery were concerned that liberal discovery circumvented
substantive law.73 Most of the opposition to liberalized discovery, however, grew
from concerns of discovery abuse: that plaintiffs used discovery "to obtain both
'smoking guns' and less inflammatory but critical evidence. '74 In 1978 and 1980,
64. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8. See also Subrin 1, supra note 22, at 743 (writing "the drafters as a group
would be amazed at how immense many cases now become and how prominent a role discovery plays in that
process").
65. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8. See also Carter, supra note 45, at 2180-81 (addressing the goals of federal
civil procedure in response to contemporary challenges).
66. Id.
67. Marcus, supra note 5, at 749.
68. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8. "For example, parties no longer had to show good cause for the discovery
of documents, and they could use discovery devices as often as they wished." Id.
69. Marcus, supra note 5, at 748.
The Advisory Committee's introduction to this package of amendments also identified the
following changes: (1) making insurance policies discoverable and thereby resolving a pre-
existing dispute about the question; (2) providing by rule for the handling of work product
and expert information; (3) allowing interrogatories and requests for admissions to seek
matters of opinion; (4) directing that answers and objections be served together; (5) putting
the burden on the party seeking discovery rather than the objector to seek court intervention;
and (6) tightening sanctions.
Id. at n. 11. The 1970 amendments were themselves contentious: "With the good cause requirement of Rule 34 gone,
practically everything becomes discoverable." George M. Vetter, Changes Ahead in the Federal Rules, 56 A.B.A.
J. 568, 571 (1970).
70. Marcus, supra note 5, at 748.
71. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act
Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 624 (1998).
72. Marcus, supra note 5, at 752.
73. Id. See also Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM L. REV. 299, 300 (1980); Milton Handler, The
Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust Suits: The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1971).
74. Marcus, supra note 5, at 749-50 (citing MICHAEL D. GREEN BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 15 (1996)). "Professor Green explains that plaintiffs'
attorneys in product liability cases rely on 'civil discovery ... [as] their best hope of obtaining information that
would reveal whether their clients had meritorious claims and, if so, provide the evidence to enable their clients to
prevail."' Id.
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rule drafters reacted to Chief Justice Warren Burger's denouncement of discovery
abuse at the 1976 Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice. 5 The American Bar Association also compiled a study
of discovery abuse, published in 1980 and available to the drafters. 6
In 1980, the Advisory Committee proposed Rule 26(f).'7 It introduced the
element of judicial intervention into what had formerly been self-executing
discovery rules.78 Judicial intervention and management of discovery is believed to
help "reduce litigation expense and delay," as "[t]he judge develops an
understanding of the case and may develop an opinion about credibility,
professionalism, and the merits of the positions being taken., 79 The judge then uses
that information to make informed decisions regarding pretrial motions. Judicial
intervention as a means of curbing discovery abuse is a theme that runs throughout
discovery amendments.
In 1983, the Advisory Committee adopted a "stronger set" of amendments.80
"The new amendments prohibited redundant discovery, required that discovery be
proportional to the magnitude of the case and mandated court sanctions for violation
of the [r]ules. ''8t Even with the new rules, discovery abuse concerns continued
through the 1980s.82 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 reflected such concerns.83
"The Act encouraged courts to consider changes in discovery, including limitations
on timing and amount of discovery and special programs to assist attorneys in better
,,81planning discovery activities.
Not until 1992 did the Advisory Committee take Sunderland's 1937 proposal
regarding mandatory disclosure to heart and implement FRCP 26(a)(1), a
significantly expanded discovery rule. It required the mandatory early pre-discovery
disclosures of "potential witnesses, documentary evidence, damage claims and
insurance.,'8' The Committee's intent was to "eliminate the time and expense of
75. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8 (citing 70 F.R.D. 79, 241 (1976)). See 92 F.R.D. 137, 137 (a forward by the
Special Litigation Section of the American Bar Association); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective
Discovery Through Local Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 778 (1985).
76. Blaner, supra note 35, at 9 (citing 92 F.R.D. 137, 141 (1980)). The published study called for rules that
reduced the scope of discovery. "[U]necessary discovery is conducted in far too many cases. Such discovery reflects
the widespread misconception ... that unlimited discovery is a litigant's entitlement on a showing of arguable
relevance to the 'subject matter' of the dispute."
77. Blaner, supra note 35, at 8.
78. Id. at 8-9.
79. Id.




84. Id. at 624-25.
85. Memorandum from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Robert
E. Keeton, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, (May 1, 1992), 146 F.R.D. 501, 527 (1993).
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preparing formal discovery requests. 86 The idea behind mandatory disclosure was
that the information disclosed would be discoverable under the "subject matter"
scope of discovery, and to require its disclosure beforehand was more efficient and
less costly than requiring each party to make motions for discovery of the
information.87 Mandatory disclosure was only adopted after bitter debates about
alternatives to, and projected costs of, automatic disclosure, as well as the proper
role of the attorney and concern about the impairment of the attorney-client
privilege.88 A great deal of debate also surrounded the impetus of automatic
disclosure.89
The idea behind automatic disclosure appears to have been the product of two
law review articles and three federal district courts. 90 Many felt they had not been
consulted on the practical matter of implementing a discovery rule requiring
automatic disclosure.9' Others felt the rule vague and overly broad. "The
amendments to the rule adopt an extremely broad relevance standard for triggering
mandatory disclosure. 92 The mandatory disclosure standard decided upon was
"material relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity. What 'particularity'
means is still unclear., 93 Writers suggest that the fatal flaw of automatic disclosure
was its ambiguity.
94
III. BACKGROUND TO THE 2000 AMENDMENTS
In 1993, the Advisory Committee made significant amendments to the discovery
rules to curb discovery abuse.95 The 1993 amendments created mandatory initial
disclosure, even disclosure of harmful information, and limits on the number of
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 501,507 (containing Justice
Scalia's dissenting statement that "the discovery proposal will increase litigation costs, burden the district courts,
and perhaps worst of all, introduce into the trial process an element that is contrary to the nature of our adversary
system").
89. Bell, supra note 4, at 14.
90. Id. at 15. The only federal courts with local automatic disclosure rules were: the Central District of
California, the Southern District of Florida, and the District of Guam. California and Florida, however, required only
"disclosure of documents that were "reasonably available" and "supportive of the party's position in the lawsuit."
Id. at 18. The two law review articles are by Judge Wayne Brazil (The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1978)) and William B. Schwarzer (The Federal Rules,
the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703 (1989)).
91. Id. at 30.
92. Eric R. Yamamoto & Joseph L. Dwight, Comment, Procedural Politics and Federal Rule 26: Opting
Out of "Mandatory" Disclosure, 16 HAWAn L. REV. 167, 186 (1994).
93. Id. at 188. For a discussion surrounding the "particularity" standard, see Virginia Hench, Can Mandatory
Disclosure Curb Discovery Abuse? The 1993 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules and the Just, Speedy and
Inexpensive Determination of Every Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 401,429 (1994).
94. Blaner, supra note 35, at 39.
95. Peter J. Beshar & Kathryn E. Nealon, Changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, NYU (Dec. 1,
2000); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's notes (1993).
2001 /Mythed It Again. The Myth of Discovery Abuse
depositions and interrogatories. 96 "These controversial proposals met a firestorm of
opposition." 97 They were considered by many, including Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, to be "radical" and "potentially disastrous."98 On the one side,
proponents of automatic disclosure considered it a tool for reducing the cost of
discovery and increasing its efficiency.99 On the other side, opponents of automatic
disclosure saw it as anathema to the adversarial judicial tradition, "plainly" requiring
an opposing attorney "to use his professional skills in the service of the
adversary."'00 One compromise between proponents and opponents was the opt-out
provision, allowing each judicial court to implement local rules for initial disclosure
and discovery.'l' Over half of the federal districts chose to opt out of the initial
disclosure rule. 102 The result was exactly what the federal rules were designed to
prevent, a lack of uniformity and predictability regarding procedure in civil
cases.'° 3Individual district judges compounded the confusion with a practice of
"layer[ing] on their own sets of rules."'04 This "patchwork and fragmented system,"
spurred a new drive for reform.'05
As a result, in 1996, the United States Judicial Conference established the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules."06 Various associations and bar groups
submitted proposals for limiting the scope of discovery.'0 7 Compounded with the
Civil Justice Reform Act, which directed the Judicial Conference "to examine
discovery and initial disclosure issues," the Committee was to study whether the
scope of discovery should change, among other subjects. "[T]he Committee
determined to focus on the architecture of the discovery rules and determine whether
modest changes could be effected to reduce the costs of discovery, to increase its
96. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (effective Dec. 1, 1993), 146 F.R.D. 501 (1993).
The limits on depositions and interrogatories were the result of the general belief that, after the institution of
automatic disclosure, much of the information received from depositions and interrogatories was now automatically
available to litigants. Memorandum from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), 146 F.R.D. 501,
529 (1993).
97. Beshar, supra note 95, at I.
98. Id. (citingAmendmentsto the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure (effective Dec. 1, 1993), 146 F.R.D. 501,
510 (1993) (Scalia, J., with Thomas and Souter, JJ, dissenting)).
99. Memorandum from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Robert
E. Keeton, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), 146 F.R.D. 501, 529 (1993).
100. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 501, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
101. Beshar, supra note 95, at 1.
102. Id. See also Donna Stienestra, Federal Judicial Center Implementation of Disclosure in United States
District Courts, With Specific Attention to Court's Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 (Mar. 30, 1998), 182 F.R.D. 304, 309-10 (1998).
103. Yamamoto, supra note 92, at 170-71.
104. Beshar, supra note 95, at 1.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2 ("The discovery project formally began in the fall of 1996.
For many years before then, the Committee had received complaints from the bar and the public that discovery costs
too much."); see also Beshar, supra, note 95, at 2.
107. The American College of Trial Lawyers and the American Bar Association Section of Litigation are
examples. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2.
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efficiency, to restore uniformity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary to
participate more actively in case management."' 8 The Committee determined,
however, that it would "expressly ... not review the question of discovery abuse."'09
The Committee appointed a Discovery Subcommittee which commissioned studies
of discovery by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) (the research department of the
federal courts) and the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice (RAND) (an
independent research corporation).°"0 The Advisory Committee's notes state that, in
1997, "nearly one-third of the lawyers surveyed in 1997 by the Federal Judicial
Center endorsed narrowing the scope of discovery as a means of reducing litigation
expense without interfering with fair case resolutions.""' The Advisory Committee
also relies upon the studies as justification to increase judicial involvement in
discovery. 112
For many years, the Committee heard complaints about discovery, primarily that
it was a vehicle for "fishing expeditions" by opposing parties without enough initial
information to sustain a cause of action. 113
[Litigants filed] complaints and answers that were generally framed, and
then used discovery to really determine whether they had complaints or
defenses that they could include in an amended complaint or amended
defense. The initial impetus for the amendment was that general feeling that
discovery had become so abused under anything "relevant to the subject
matter of the pending action" that it had become necessary to limit
discovery to the "claims or defenses" of the pending action. 114
Compounded with concerns about the cost and delay of discovery, 15 the Litigation
Section of the American Bar Association, 16 other bar groups, 17 and defense
attorneys 18 recommended narrowing the scope of discovery.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Tobias, supra note 9, at 1404.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note (citing T. Willging et al., Disclosure and Discovery
Practice, Problems, and Proposals for Change, Federal Judiciary Center (1997), which analyzed the results of the
1997 Federal Judicial Center survey of trial attorneys.
112. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17.
113. Lynk, supra note 1.
114. Id.
115. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
116. Id. (stating that the Litigation Section of the American bar Association first proposed that the Advisory
Committee delete the"subject matter" matter language in 1978).
117. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
118. Trends in Defense Law: Supreme Court Recommends Expert Evidence, Discovery Rule Changes, FOR
THE DEFENSE vol. 42, No. 7 (July, 2000) (stating that the Defense Research Institute, Inc. (DRI), "supported
strongly" the amendments, that attorneys for DRI presented oral testimony and written statements, and that DRI
"worked to generate grassroots support for the amendments from state and local defense organizations and from
corporate counsel").
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Premised primarily upon the FJC and RAND studies, the Advisory Committee
released proposals for discovery revisions and received public comment in August
of 1998."9 The Committee received responses fromjudges, academics, practitioners,
and bar associations. 120 The Committee revised the proposed amendments and
submitted them for approval to the United States Judicial Conference. ' 2 'The United
States Judicial Conference approved the rules and submitted them for the approval
of the United States Supreme Court. 22 The Supreme Court approved the proposed
rules on April 17, 2000.123 "Under the Rules Enabling Act, the proposed
amendments go into effect on [December first] unless both houses of Congress vote
to modify, amend or delete the rules. In this election year, that did not
happen....,24 The amended rule became effective December 1, 2000.125
IV. THE 2000 AMENDMENTS TO FRCP 26(B)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) was the most controversial 2000
amendment to the FRCP. 126 Proponents of the amendments won the Advisory
Committee recommendation only by a vote of thirteen to twelve. There are three
amendments to FRCP 26(b)(1). This Comment subsequently examines and critiques
each amendment.
A. The Narrowed Scope of Discovery
The first significant change is that the scope of discovery has been limited to
"any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party."'' 27
Since 1946, discovery was bounded only by "any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.' 28 For example, under
the old rule, if the plaintiff sued for negligence, and the defendant's answer denied
negligence but did not raise a contributory negligence claim, the defendant will
probably be able to discover information about plaintiff's own negligence under the
119. Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference on the United States,
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 18, 21 (1998).
120. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3. See also Beshar, supra, note 95, at 2.
121. Beshar, supra note 95, at 2.
122. See Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2.
123. Beshar, supra note 95, at 2. See also communication from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Hon.
J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 17, 2000), http://uscourts.gov (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
124. Beshar, supra note 95, at 2. Had this not been an election year, would Congress have resisted the passage
of the 2000 amendments? The outcome remains unclear. By April 2000, there was no evidence that Congress had
even looked at the proposed amendments. Schreiber, supra note 1.
125. Id.
126. Schreiber, supra note 1.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (pre-2000 amendments).
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"subject matter" standard. 129 Or, in a products liability case, where the plaintiff
alleges one theory of liability, may seek discovery on an alternate theory. 30 Or, the
plaintiff might sue the defendant for wrongful discharge, alleging that she was fired
because she was under contract to receive more pay than other employees. The
amount of pay received by other managers would fall within the "subject matter" of
the action. 131
By "relevant," the rule is not restricted to evidence that would be admissible at
trial. 32 Evidence sought to be discovered must be "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."' 133 For example, hearsay evidence would be
discoverable, even though not admissible at trial. Its discovery would be reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence, the name of the original speaker and the
content of the statement. By changing the "subject matter" language to "claim or
defense," the Committee intended to limit and focus discovery. 3 a Arguably, that a
party was convicted of perjury six years ago may not be relevant to a claim or
defense,135 whereas it may be easier to find it falls within the "subject matter" of the
pending action.
While the Committee recognized that "The dividing line between information
relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the
action cannot be defined with precision,"'' 36 the Committee intended that the court
and the parties focus on "the actual claims and defenses involved in the action."'
137
It did note, however, that "information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit
could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action.'" '38 The
Committee cites as examples "other incidents of the same type, or involving the
same product" as properly discoverable under the amended rule. 3 9 Furthermore,
"[i]nformation about organizational arrangements or filing systems of a party could
be discoverable if likely to yield or lead to the discovery of admissible
information."'' 40 Also, information used "to impeach a likely witness, although not
otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly discoverable.'' In
129. This example is based upon the definition given by Hon. Lee Rosenthal, supra note 1.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Cornet Stores v. Superior Court, 108 Ariz. 84, 492 P.2d 1191 (1972).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Lindberger v. General Motors Corp., 56 F.R.D. 433 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
134. Lynk, supra note 1.
135. This is an example used by Gregory Joseph, Esq., New York City, Chair, ABA Section of Litigation,
Transcript of the 'Alumni' Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 809, 832 (1998). No panelist was able to
give an opinion about whether the perjury conviction is relevant to the claim or defense. Id. at 833-34.
136. There is a great deal of controversy over this concession by the Advisory Committee. It has been called
"something of an understatement" (Beshar, supra note 95, at 4) and "[tihe understatement of the year" (Hon. Shira
Ann Scheindlin, supra note 1).





2001 / Mythed It Again. The Myth of Discovery Abuse
sum, whether information is discoverable "depends on the circumstances of the
pending action." 142
The Committee intended the new language to flag the authority of the court to
confine discovery to the matters relevant to the pleadings 143 and to place the litigants
on notice that they "have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims and
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings."' 44 A majority of the
committee felt that the amendment was needed to proscribe parties from "using
discovery to flesh out or add counts to the complaint that had not been added
initially."' 145 According to the authors of the amended rule, "Pleadings now need to
be framed with FRCP 26(b)(1) in mind."'146 A litigant's ability to obtain discovery
with respect to any claim or defense depends upon how broadly or narrowly the
pleadings were drafted. The Committee foresaw that making discovery for the most
part dependent upon the pleadings would lead to "motion practice that will help to
resolve, define, and refine these provisions."'' 47 The Committee expected, as with
any amendment, an initial period in which motions practice would clarify the
"relevant to the claim or defense" scope of discovery.
In the event that the parties disagreed about what matters are relevant to a claim
or defense, the Committee pointed out that litigants are not starting with a "blank
tablet" with regard to how a court will rule. 148 Case law will distinguish between the
old and new rule. "There is a body of case law that describes these concepts. The
words are not new."'
149
142. Id.
143. Scheindlin, supra note 1.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
145. Lynk, supra note 1.
146. Id.
147. Id. Essentially, the Committee envisions the new pleadings to be more specific than what is allowed
under FED. R. CIV. P. 8, but not as specific as to harken back to the days of code pleading. Id.
148. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
149. Id. One example isAbell v. Frank, 625 F.2d 653, 656 (1980), writing:
Exceptions to the privilege in court proceedings exist.., when the proceedings are brought
by the patient/client against a professional, including but not limited to malpractice
proceedings, and in any criminal or license revocation proceedings in which the patient/client
is a complaining witness and in which disclosure is relevant to the claim or defense of a
professional.
This case law will differ, for example, from cases like Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51
(1978), writing:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. The key phrase in this definition-"relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action"-has been construed broadly to encompass any
matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any
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According to the Committee, "The change was adopted against a wealth of
empirical data that.., the tools already present in the rules were not being invoked
as a meaningful limit."5 ° The Committee asserted that the pre-2000 amendment rule
was consistently misread by courts and litigants alike to allow for "limitless"
discovery-not what was intended in the 1993 amendments to FRCP 26(b)(1). 15' The
general feeling of proponents of the amendment was that a great amount of
discovery proceed largely without intervention by the judiciary.5 Often, proponents
of narrowed discovery cite anecdotal evidence which suggests that litigants used the
rule for limitless discovery, something the new rule was designed to stop.
53
Proponents of narrowed discovery also point out that discovery of information
relevant to the "subject matter" of the pending action may be ordered by the court
for good cause. 154 As detailed below, allowing the expanded scope of discovery for
good cause shown creates a two-step mechanism for judicial management of
discovery. 155
B. The Two-Step Discovery Procedure
The 2000 amendment introduces a two-step protocol for pretrial discovery.
56
While the proposal for the language change is at least twenty years old, the two-
tiered relevance approach is a recent creation. The first step is the attorney-initiated
mandatory initial disclosure of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party."157 Should a party decline to produce material because
it is not relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery, the
requesting party may then move to obtain discovery in the alternative. 58 The
requesting party must convince the court that the requested material is either
relevant to a claim or defense or, in the alternative, that he has shown good cause.'
5
1
A showing to the court of "good cause" would allow discovery of "any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action."' 6 According to the Advisory
Committee notes following the amended rule, "The good-cause standard warranting
issue that is or may be in the case. [citation omitted]. Consistently with the notice-pleading
system established by the Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings,
for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues. [citation omitted]. Nor
is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may arise
during litigation that are not related to the merits.






156. Lynk, supra note 1.
157. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
158. Lynk, supra note 1.
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
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broader discovery is meant to be flexible." 161 In sum, the attorney-initiated, or party-
controlled, discovery is bounded "in terms of matter relevant to the claim or defense
of any party. The court, however, retains authority to order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action for good cause."'1
62
While the differences between attorney-initiated relevancy and court-ordered
relevancy may initially seem confusing, one proponent of the amendment proposes
easy definitions for the two standards.163 "Discovery is relevant to the claims and
defenses when it tends to prove, disprove, or illuminate the claims and defenses in
the pleadings."'' 64 And, discovery is "relevant to the subject matter of the suit when
it is relevant to claims or defenses that, while not currently pleaded, may reasonably
become part of the pleadings through amendments but require discovery before
amendments can be made."'
165
The purpose of the two-step approach is to increase involvement of thejudiciary
in pretrial discovery. 166 "The amendment is designed to involve the court more
actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery."'' 67 The
Advisory Committee notes that increased court management of discovery is strongly
endorsed by attorneys 168 for the purpose of limiting the use of discovery for "fishing
expeditions." 169 "[I]nvolvement of the court in managing discovery is an important
method of controlling problems of inappropriately broad discovery."
'
170
C. Good-bye Opt-Out Provision
Finally, the 2000 amendments to Rule 26 require compliance by all ninety-four
federal district courts, as there is no longer an opt-out provision within the rule. 17 '
Before the 2000 amendments, federal courts were allowed to create local rules for
initial disclosure by litigants. 172 Opponents of opt-out provisions reasoned that to
allow jurisdictional discrepancies only served to "balkanize" the ninety-four federal
district courts. 17 3 In the interest of uniformity between jurisdictions, one of the
161. id.
162. Id.
163. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
164. Id.
165. id.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
167. Id.
168. See id. (citing Willging, supra note 108) (analyzing the results ofthe 1997 Federal Judicial Center survey
of trial attorneys, both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys).
169. Lynk, supra note I.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). The opt-out provision was allowed by the 1993 amendments as a compromise
between those for and against the mandatory disclosure provision. Lynk, supra note 1.
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), pre-2000 amendment.
173. Lynk, supra note 1.
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primary reasons for the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
the jurisdictional opt-out provision has been removed.'74
While all jurisdictions must enforce the automatic disclosure rule in FRCP
26(a)(1), "'75 the 2000 amendments to FRCP 26(b)(1) also narrow the scope of what
must be automatically disclosed. 7 6 Before the 2000 amendments, litigants were
required to automatically disclose anything "relevant to the subject matter" of the
action. 177 Now, automatic disclosure is limited to information "relevant to the claim
or defense of any party."'
' 78
V. ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE 2000
AMENDMENTS TO FRCP 26(B)(1)
A. The Empirical Data
The threshold question in the controversy surrounding the 2000 amendments is
whether reform of the scope of discovery was even necessary. 179 Proponents of the
amended rule believe it necessary to curb discovery abuses, many of which make
litigation lengthy and costly. 180 There is some question, however, about the
reformers' reliance upon empirical data in the FJC and RAND studies.'
81
"[P]roponents and opponents of further discovery will mine these studies to support
whatever conclusions they wish to advance, and selective interpretation of the data
will accomplish many ends."'
182
The conventional wisdom about discovery is that it is "abusive, time-
consuming, unproductive, and too costly.' ' 183 There is an oft-quoted claim that
"discovery accounts for about 80 percent of litigation costs."' 184 The RAND findings
showed that there is no discovery in 38 percent of civil cases. 85 The FJC found no
discovery in approximately 50 percent of civil cases. 186 For half of the cases RAND
174. Id.
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (before December, 2001).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
179. Edward R. Cavanagh, Hinder Discovery in Ways Unnecessary and Unjust, LEGALTIMES (July 27, 1998),
at 21.
180. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)( 1) advisory committee's note (discussing concerns which prompted the changes
in the discovery rules).
181. Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21.
182. Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683
(1998).
183. Thomas E. Willging, et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998).
184. Elizabeth Thornburg, Giving the 'Haves' a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52
SMU L. REV. 229, 245 (1999).
185. Mullenix, supra note 182, at 684.
186. Id.
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surveyed, "the median time lawyers report spending on discovery is only three
hours. 187 So, "[o]verall, lawyer work hours per litigant on discovery... [are] low
for the majority of cases."'
188
The findings of the FJC, reported to the Advisory Committee in 1997, yielded
results far different from conventional wisdom about discovery costs, as well. 189 In
fact, empirical research suggests that "voluminous discovery tends to be related to
case characteristics such as complexity and case type .... [T]he typical case has
relatively little discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to the stakes of
the litigation."' 90
In the FJC's survey of attorneys in closed civil cases, it found that total litigation
costs of the attorney are approximately thirteen-thousand dollars. 191 Roughly half of
that amount was attributable to discovery.' 92 When compared with the relative stakes
of the cases, the cost of discovery approximated 3 percent of the total stake.' 93 The
costs of discovery rose as the stakes of the case increased. 194 As RAND reported, "It
is the minority of cases with high discovery costs that generate the anecdotal 'parade
of horribles' that dominates much of the debate over discovery rules and discovery
case management."'
195
Many writers feel that the FJC and RAND reports are statistical evidence
proving no "universal" and systematic discovery abuse problem.196 "[D]iscovery is
generally working well and . . . the 1993 revisions have been efficacious,
particularly by limiting considerable contentiousness which attended discovery
without prejudicing litigants' rights to secure necessary discovery."'
197
Furthermore, discovery problems arise in complex cases, often class actions.'98
The proposed measures "apply to all lawsuits, even though the recent FJC and
RAND studies indicate that overbroad discovery principally occurs in a rather small
number of complicated cases. '199 But, even in complex cases, plaintiff's attorneys
believe the pre-amended rule made it less difficult and less costly to ascertain
facts.200 For example, one author has cited general aviation cases as an area in which
"counsel for plaintiffs are not employed until weeks, months, or even years after a
187. Id. at 684.
188. Id. at 685 (citing James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998)).
189. Willging, supra note 183, at 527. "Discovery is not a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority
of cases." Mullenix, supra note 182, at 685 (citing Kakalik et al., supra note 188).
190. Willging, supra note 183, at 527.
191. Id. at 548, 576.
192. Id. at 548.
193. Id. at 549.
194. Id. at 550.
195. Mullenix, supra note 182, at 685.
196. Id.
197. Tobias, supra note 9, at 1440.
198. Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21.
199. Tobias, supra note 9, at 1440.
200. See generally John J. Kennelly, Discovery-From the Standpoint of the Plaintiff, 18 FORUM 150 (1982).
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general aviation accident" and are often "confronted with serious difficulties in
ascertaining facts."' '2 Counter to that, however, is that bythe time of the pleadings,
"plaintiffs presumably have completed their preliminary investigation at the time
they file their complaints and thus are aware of the evidence supporting their
allegations at that time. 2°2 In part, the 2000 amendments to FRCP 26(b)(1)
generated incredible opposition from those who felt the new reforms were aimed at
complex civil litigation cases, far less than half of all civil cases using discovery.0 3
If discovery was working well in the majority of civil cases, then "why did the
Advisory Committee decide to recommend this change now"? 204 One possible
explanation is that defendant organizations felt the time was ripe to lobby Congress
for an amenable discovery amendment. 20 5 Simply put, "[c]ommittee discussions
often reflect political reality, and decisions are made on that basis. ' ' °
B. A Rule That Favors Defendants?
Not only does the voluble opposition to the new rule claim it was intended to
limit discovery in complex cases, opposition to the amendments propose the new
rule only benefits complex civil defense.20 7 Lobbying groups in favor of limiting
discovery are typically defendant based, representing products liability, securities,
and antitrust attorneys. 208 The American College of Trial Lawyers and the Defense
Research Institute, Inc., came out strongly in favor of limiting the scope of
discovery.209 Not surprisingly, plaintiff-based associations claim discovery abuses
are rare. 2 0 The Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America both recommended against changing federal discovery rules.2 1
201. Id.
202. Michael J. Wagner, Too Much, Too Costly, Too Soon? The Automatic Disclosure Amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 29 ToRTS & INS. L.J. 468 (1994) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) as the
consequence for plaintiffs if they do not have support for their complaint).
203. Thornburg, supra note 184, at 245, 256 (noting responses to the proposed rule by large lobbying
organizations of attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants); see also Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21 (noting that the
proponents of the new rule believe these fears to be "exaggerated").
204. Tobias, supra note 9, at 1440.
205. "Congress has interfered." Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C.L. REV. 809,
838 (1998). According to Mark Gitenstein, Congressional interference with the federal rules is not a new
phenomenon. Id.
206. Arthur Miller, Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 809,837 (1998).
"Because hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake in [the 5 percent of cases]. And both from the plaintiffs bar
point of view and the business community's point of view, those sorts of things are not going to go unnoticed. And
they're going to try to win those cases wherever they can. They're going to try to win them in court. They're going
to try to win them in Congress. They're going to try to win them in this Committee." Mark Gitenstein, Transcript
of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 809, 838 (1998).
207. Thornburg, supra note 184, at 243.
208. Id. (citing Judith Resnick, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Pressure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494,583
(1986)); see also, Thornburg, supra note 184, at 245-46.
209. Id. at 245; see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 36.
210. Rex Bossert, Many Suggest Changing the Nature ofDiscovery, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 13, 1997, at A12.
211. Thornburg, supra note 184, at 245.
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There are two immediately apparent reasons the amended rule may be favored
by defendant litigants and their attorneys. The first is that the rule itself may create
opportunities for discovery disputes by parties called upon to produce materials.
2 2
Since 1938, courts have developed a wealth of case law which is "relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action . ,,2 . Many predict significant
litigation surrounding the new boundaries of discoverable information-that
"relevant to any claim or defense" in the action.21 4 As a result, litigation surrounding
the definitions of relevancy will be costly.2 " This argument works if one accepts the
premise that defendants are more likely to litigate to limit the scope of discovery
than plaintiffs. Oftentimes, the economics of plaintiff-side litigation are such that the
plaintiff must carefully choose which issues are worth litigation and its attendant
CoStS. 216 Whether one argues for a broad or limited definition of "relevant" depends
on whether one is aiming for broad or limited discovery. According to the
Committee, "Litigants will argue both sides of the debate just as they did before the
committee."
21 7
The second reason defendants may favor the amended rule is that the burden has
shifted to the plaintiff to expand discovery. Under the pre-amendment rule, the
burden was on the defendant to limit overly broad requests of the plaintiff.21 8 Now,
however, it is the plaintiff's burden to ask the court for the second tier of discovery,
that which allows the plaintiff discovery beyond the claims and defenses.2 '9 The
court may expand the plaintiff's permitted discovery with a showing of good
cause. 220 Determinations of good cause may be highly discretionary and, as the
Advisory Committee intended, case specific. 22' Encouraging judicial discretion in
the rule "layers uncertainty on top of uncertainty and is begging to be repeatedly
litigated. 22 2 The Committee points out that they expect an initial flurry of litigation
over the new scope of discovery, but that, like with the 1993 amendments, it will
provide guidance for later litigants.22 3 The counter-argument is that the initial flurry
will be highly case specific and "not likely to generate caselaw over time that
provides guidance to litigants [or] decrease ... the flow of disputes.
224
212. Id. at 256.
213. Id.
214. Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21.
215. Id.
216. See Thornburg, supra note 184, at 257 (stating that defendants who resist producing discoverable
material "forcethe plaintiff to invest greater time and money in acquiring the information").
217. Lynk, supra note 1.
218. Scheindlin, supra note 1.
219. Id.
220. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I).
221. See discussion of the Committee's intent for adding the good cause requirement, supra note 69.
222. Thornburg, supra note 184, at 257.
223. Scheindlin, supra note 1.
224. Thornburg, supra note 184, at 257.
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The argument surrounding the necessity of changing the scope of discovery is
at odds with its effect. The Committee meant to use the language of the amended
rule to limit the "limitless" scope of the pre-2000 rule.225 With that in mind, the
language requires that discoverable material be relevant to a claim or defense.226 The
Advisory Committee Notes, however, make it clear that courts should be flexible
when deciding issues of "relevancy., 227 The amendment essentially limits the scope
of discovery with its language, then expands the scope with the Advisory Committee
Notes. Discovery is now more limited than the 1993 rule, but broader than the 2000
language. Judicial discretion lies somewhere in between. One judge explains,
[R]atcheting back on the scope provision in any form would be a
monumental signal to the profession. The consequences you would get by
doing that would have more to do with people reading tea leaves and
saying, my God, this idea has been kicking around for twenty years.
Suddenly they put it into the rule. As a strict constructionist or plain
meaning person, I've got to give it effect.228
Decisions about relevance are "virtually unreviewable. 229 Consequently, uniformity
sought at the federal level may instead be ethereal. The new reform is somewhat
confusing and may be even unnecessary given the control courts already exercise
over the scope of discovery.23°
Perhaps the Committee should have addressed abuses in discovery in "clearly
defined classes of cases where ... problems still arise., 23' As mentioned earlier,
232problems arise in complex cases, often class actions,. But, even in complex cases,
plaintiffs' attorneys believe the pre-amended rule made it less difficult and less
costly to ascertain facts.233 For example, one author has cited general aviation cases
as an area in which "counsel for plaintiffs are not employed until weeks, months, or
even years after a general aviation accident" and are often "confronted with serious
225. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). (The language of the rule now reads, "Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.").
227. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's notes. Clarifying that information must be relevant to be
discoverable, even if inadmissible-essentially including all admissible evidence. This appears to be a retreat from
the express text of the rule.
228. Miller, supra note 206, at 833 (1998).
229. Thornburg, supra note 184, at 252.
230. Tobias, supra note 9, at 1441; see also Thornton v. Mercantile Stores Company, Inc., 180 F.R.D. 437
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (noting that the court has a broad measure of discretion in handling pre-trial affairs-including
discovery); Miller v. Federal Express Corp., 186 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (stating that a court has discretion
to decide when discovery will lead to admissible evidence).
231. Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21.
232. Id.
233. Id. (suggesting that satellite litigation regarding the newly narrowed scope of discovery may increase
time and cost of post-2000 litigation).
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difficulties in ascertaining facts., 234 Counter to that, however, is that by the time of
the pleadings, "plaintiffs presumably have completed their preliminary investigation
at the time they file their complaints and thus are aware of the evidence supporting
their allegations at that time., 235 The Committee was targeting exactly this type of
complex case with high stakes; the Advisory Committee Notes state, "the
amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth
of discovery in cases involving sweeping or contentious discovery. 236
In sum, given the increased opportunity to litigate, the possible reluctance of
many plaintiffs to take on the increased costs of discovery litigation, and the burden-
shifting mechanism of the two-tiered discovery protocol, the amended rule may
benefit defendants in complex, high stakes litigation.237 Those are not the only
criticisms of the amended rule, though. Other criticisms include the necessity of the
two-tiered approach for increasing judicial involvement in discovery and the new
rule's effect on notice pleading.238
With respect to the former, when the FJC survey asked attorneys about factors
associated with discovery problems, 83 percent found no problems with the court's
management of discovery. 239 But, attorneys did note that judicial case management
through discovery ranked first when asked which type of reform held the greatest
promise for reducing discovery problems. 240 "[T]he most frequent choice by the
attorneys was to increase the availability of judges to resolve discovery disputes (54
percent).,24' How increased "availability" of judges to resolve disputes translates
into the Advisory Committee's removal of the "subject matter" language and the
inception of the two-step discovery reform is unclear.242 The Committee proposes
the two-tiered mechanics will increasejudicial "involvement" in discovery. Whether
judges want to increase their involvement in motions practice is debatable.243 The
Committee, however, felt that the "rule facilitates and provides for judicial
intervention. Judges must rule on disputes that go to the heart of the litigation. These
are not disputes that need 'adult supervision' instead of judicial intervention."2"
234. Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21.
235. Wagner, supra note 202, at 468 (1994) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) as the consequence for plaintiffs if
they do not have support for their complaint).
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's notes.
237. Schreiber, supra note I (saying "I firmly believe this rule was written for the products liability area.").
238. Id.
239. Willging, supra note 183, at 541.
240. Id. at 542.
241. Id.
242. Lynk, supra note 1.
243. One district court judge in South Carolina said "This new rule creates untold havoc on the discovery
process as we know it. Get ready for an avalanche of motions." Schreiber, supra note I (quoting an unnamed district
court judge).
244. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
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C. How Will the 2000 Amendments Affect the Pleadings?
One final criticism is that the amended rule changes the nature of pleadings. The
Federal Rules only require notice pleadings. 24' This notion of general pleading has
prevailed since the 1938 adoption of the federal rules.246 Deleting the "subject
matter" language and replacing it with "any claim or defense" language will change
the nature of federal pleadings.
[T]he proposed "claim or defense" stricture may require that plaintiffs
attempt to draft specific pleadings before they can secure material that is
under defendants' control that would now be available through discovery.
The "claim or defense" language could lead plaintiffs to include in
pleadings broader assertions than the material they possess supports to
secure greater discovery, thereby exposing plaintiffs to motions to dismiss
and motions for Rule 11 sanctions.247
If the key to discoverability rests on the "claim or defense," elaborate statements of
claims or defenses "may be necessary to obviate successful resistance to legitimate
discovery., 248 At the pleading stage, parties will be forced to be as specific as
possible "at a time when they may lack enough information to see how the big
picture might unfold.2 49 That, however, is exactly what the Committee intended.25°
The Committee expects that complaints will have to be plead "with particularity."251
That is a phrase that probably gives the original drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure the shivers, as the rules were designed exactly to prevent pleadings
"with particularity."
VI. CONCLUSION
Will the 2000 amendments have their intended effect? If the purpose of the
amendments was not to address discovery abuse, as the Committee literature
suggests, then why was it necessary to change the scope of discovery? The two-
tiered discovery mechanism seems to be a compromise between those set on limiting
the scope of discovery and those who fear the effects of limited discovery upon
plaintiffs.2 As compromises between factions of plaintiffs and defendants, the 2000
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a "short and plain statement of the claim"); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b) (requiring
defenses to be "stated in short and plain terms").
246. Tobias, supra note 9, at 1441 (writing before the amended rule took effect).
247. Id. at 1440.
248. Gregory P. Joseph, Civil Rules 11, THE NAT'L L.J., (Apr. 24, 2000), at A17.
249. Cavanagh, supra note 179, at 21.
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251. Id.
252. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3.
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amendments certainly seem to give credence to the adage, "abuse is what your
opponent is doing., 253 The Committee determined that limiting the scope of
attorney-initiated discovery would reduce the costs of discovery by increasing the
efficiency of the process. 2 4 The Committee also views earlier and greater judicial
involvement in the discovery process as another means by which to decrease costs
and time of discovery.2 5  Even if those ends can be distinguished from discovery
"abuse," whether or not the ends are entirely supportable with empirical data is
debatable. While the data is debatable, the rule is assailable. "It is difficult to get
excited about rule reform when the data suggest that the best prudential course is to
do nothing. ' 56
253. Miller, supranote 206, at 815.
254. Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3.
255. Id.
256. Mullenix, supra note 182, at 689.
